Is an egg really an egg if no one believes it is?
On March 22, 1769, one man by the name of Edward Baubler invented the egg in his home in Dresden, Germany. Such a miraculous discovery allowed for a swift culinary revolution, as the succulent treat was quickly incorporated into all varieties of recipes. It is thanks to Mr. Baubler that you are able to enjoy that cheesy, spinach omelette you always eat on Wednesdays at 7:45 in the morning, sharp.
All of this is, to the surprise of absolutely nobody, untrue; I made it up. Nobody invented the egg, unless you consider the concept of evolution something other than a nobody. In essence, invention requires both a discovery and a specific action, and the egg has already been both discovered and acted upon by a good many fellows before our hypothetical Mr. Baubler. Now, this doesn’t mean that Mr. Baubler isn’t allowed to devour a good, seasoned scrambled egg or two, it merely indicates that his consumption is not necessarily possible without the aid of whomever was truly responsible for the egg in the first place.
In order to acquire a well-produced egg, there must exist some fellow who can manufacture the ovicular object, perhaps a chicken or platypus or something of the like. Beyond this, however, the boundaries in regards to how an egg should be obtained become distinctly indistinct. If, say, one was to receive an egg through illegitimate means, did that fellow ever really own an egg at all? Is this something truly worth considering? Perhaps… and perhaps not. According to senior egg ponderer Vincent Mattei – who is extremely well versed in the art of egg philosophy – “it’s important to take into account the whole perspective of what is, what could be, and everything that lies in between.” In order to provide further context, we will next reformat this dictation into a necessary anecdote.
Take this fellow named Barnaby Bollifisicus. He is a Canadian feller, born and raised in the icy wilds of the Yukon. In his northern hometown of Old Crow (which is an irrelevant location that will not be described any further), he works his family’s mechanic shop, providing automotive services for any foolish tourists who couldn’t afford a trip to somewhere a bit more interesting. Every day Barnaby wakes up, cooks himself a pair of frozen waffles, drizzles them with that delicious McCarrey family patented syrup, and heads out to man the shop. Despite having already existed on this mortal plane for four long decades, Barnaby Bollifisicus has not once tasted the sweet-savory relish of an egg. Now, this doesn’t necessarily mean that he doesn’t know what eggs are, it just asserts that he has yet to encounter one. As long as Barnaby cannot personally confirm whether an egg truly exists, it remains locked within a limbo between materialization and nonexistence, at least to him. Even if Barnaby believes that an egg could exist, as long as he cannot identify one, its form is not necessitated. Mattei provides a similar interpretation: “When Barnaby first comes across an egg, he has no preconceived notion of what an egg is. What matters is how we perceive an egg. It’s all about perspective.” Within Barnaby’s own personal reality, eggs cannot and do not exist, which means that, in a sense (Barnaby’s sense), eggs aren’t real.
Unfortunately, we are now left with more questions than answers: what, then dictates reality? In order for something to exist, must it maintain a sense of being? And, most importantly, if an egg ever wasn’t, was it ever? Essentially, we are forced to discern if the fundamental nature of an entity masterminds its form. Now, back to the context of an egg: by definition, an egg must be an egg, defined as an organic vessel developed by an animal, designed to carry genetic material in the form of an undeveloped zygote. If you were to throw the individual molecules within an egg into disarray, however, you would in theory present an entirely unique creation. With this in mind, we must conclude how much entropic force would have to be present in order for an egg to be refurbished into something that could be considered not an egg. This creation does not necessarily have to be specifically anything else, as long as it isn’t an egg. This means that it could be no more than a pointless jumble of atoms arranged within an enclosed space, or perhaps a banana. Anything goes, as long as what’s produced isn’t an egg. Any pile of atoms could be considered an egg, as long as somebody is willing to do so. In some regard, it doesn’t even matter what something actually is at one designated point in space-time, since it always maintains the potential to be something else entirely.
In a vacuum, what is and isn’t is determined almost entirely by perspective alone. Let’s think back to our good friend Barnaby: because this fellow has never once seen an egg, he has no preconception of what an egg should actually look like, leading Mattei to suggest an interesting concept, “to me, this rock is something else entirely. The purpose is to transcend the meaning of what an egg is and what it isn’t. The true definition of what an egg is is how we perceive it.” By definition, an egg does not have any one definition; it can exist in any way, at any point, and at any given instance. Because of this, the existence of an egg depends entirely on if it is perceived as existing.
To put it in the simplest terms I can muster, in order to be an egg, an egg must both be an egg while also persisting as an egg. An egg cannot be anything other than an egg as long as it’s egghood is subjectively that of an egg. Any egg that is decidedly not an egg is not permanently restricted from being an egg, since it can and will at some point, be an egg, by the definition of what constitutes an egg. In a sense, everything around you is an egg, or was an egg at some point in the infinite warp of spacetime. In a sense, you are an egg, and I too may be one eventually. In a sense, an egg is an egg is an egg, and an egg is – but may not always be – egg, in a sense.